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Abstract: 
 
This paper is the result of an empirical research project analysing the decision behaviour of 
Austrian managers in ethical dilemma situations. While neoclassical economic theory would 
suggest a pure economic rational basis for management decisions, the empirical study 
conducted by the authors put other concepts to a test, thereby analysing their importance for 
managerial decision making: specific notions of fairness, reciprocal altruism, and 
commitment. After reviewing some of the theoretical literature dealing with such notions, the 
paper shows the results of an online survey working with scenarios depicting ethical dilemma 
situations. By judging such scenarios the respondents showed their preference for the named 
concepts, though with different degrees of confirmation.  
 
The results (with all limitations of an online survey in mind) support the theoretical work on 
the named concepts: Fairness elements (including Rawlsian principles of justice and an 
understanding of fairness as conceived by a reference transaction) play a major part in 
management decisions in ethical dilemma situations. Also, commitment as a behaviour that 
sticks to rules even if personal welfare is negatively touched, and reciprocal altruism as a 
cooperative behaviour that expects a reciprocal beneficial action from other persons have 
been concepts used by Austrian managers when analysing ethical dilemmas. The article also 
tries to put the results into a comparative perspective by taking into account other studies on 
ethical decision factors conducted with e.g. medical doctors or journalists, and by discussing 
intercultural implications of business ethics. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
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The reintegration of ethical concepts into business and economic theory is a field of interest 
for many researchers in the interdisciplinary field of business ethics. Theoretical literature on 
this topic is growing exponentially, as are new insights into how such an integration can be 
managed, culminating maybe in the award of the Nobel prize in economics to Amartya Sen 
and his capability approach to economic ethics (see Sen, 1987, 1992, 1999, 2003). One major 
question in business ethics has been whether managers actually decide according to pure 
economic rational motives (which most traditional economic models would imply) or whether 
there are additional concepts to be taken into account, such as principles of fairness, 
reciprocity or commitment (as behavioural economics and experimental economics would 
suggest). To tackle this question, more empirical research seems necessary to complement the 
vast theoretical insights of business ethics. 
 
This paper argues that there are some concepts that managers use intentionally or 
subconsciously when dealing with moral dilemma situations. Such concepts would be specific 
notions of fairness (including Rawlsian principles of justice), reciprocal altruism (to depict 
altruistic behaviour as long as a reciprocal beneficial action can be expected), and 
commitment (to include non utility maximizing goals into one’s goal set by e.g. acting 
according to rules). In addition there seems to be a unified decision basis for ethical decisions 
in management, which leads to the specification of a characteristic “type” of decision maker: 
the Rawls/Kant type, meaning that Rawlsian and Kantian decision principles, such as fairness 
deliberations and deontological criteria (like the categorical imperative), play a major role 
when managers are confronted with ethical dilemmas. Accordingly, if these arguments be 
correct, the pure economic theory of rationality would not be an adequate framework for 
explaining managerial decision processes.  
 
To prove our points, this paper describes parts of an empirical study conducted for the Jubilee 
Fund of the Austrian Central Bank during 2009i. We use statistical material from an online 
survey of Austrian managers, who were confronted with dilemma situations and had to decide 
on the appropriateness of different reactions to the used scenarios. This technique is more and 
more used in empirical surveys (see e.g. Hauser, 2006), in order to avoid socially desired 
answers and bring abstract concepts to life in everyday management situations. Even though 
the study was of an exploratory nature, we can show the actual interconnection of some 
business ethics concepts and managerial decision processes, a result which may pave the way 
for future operationalization of business ethics and better inclusion into management practice. 
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 gives the theoretical background of the survey items 
and centres on the question of alternative decision bases (compared to economic rationality) 
as developed in the literature. Section 3 describes the survey design; section 4 shows the 
major results of the relevant scenarios and their connection to the concepts derived from 
literature. In section 4 we also provide a comparative perspective of some results by including 
findings from similar studies regarding other professions. In section 5 we give a résumé and 
suggest future improvements of the used method. Implications for international and 
intercultural business ethics are suggested.  
 
2. Theoretical Concepts 
 
This section gives a short overview about some major ethical concepts discussed in the 
business ethics literature. Selection of these concepts is based on a literature survey which 
was part of the named project for the Jubilee Fund of the Austrian Central Bank. Further 
confirmation that these concepts play an important role for Austrian managers was derived 
from a qualitative pre-study (expert interviews; see also section 3 on the survey design). Due 
to these findingsii within the project, the authors chose to develop the scenario items around 
these concepts (see section 4). 
 
2.1 Economic Rationality in Management Decisions 
 
Modern decision theory and microeconomics (and therefore a major part of business 
administration and management theories) are based on the concept of economic rationality 
and homo oeconomicus behaviour. The model implies that persons facing scarcity situations 
will behave according to strict predictions by gathering their goals in a consistent ranking and 
use the best means (“instruments” as is implicit in the term “instrumental rationality”) 
efficiently to reach their goals. There are no psychological or sociological components to be 
found in that approach (e.g. Sturn 1997, p. 71), because the only task of it is to compare the 
use of means with the degree of goal reaching and state possible inefficiencies. The economist 
and methodologist Marc Blaug defines this approach as used by economists: “For the 
economist, however, rationality means choosing in accordance with a preference ordering that 
is complete and transitive, subject to perfect and costlessly acquired information; where there 
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is uncertainty about future outcomes, rationality means maximizing expected utility, that is, 
the utility of an outcome multiplied by the probability of its occurrence” (Blaug 1992, p. 229). 
 
The methodological basis for such an approach is individualism and subjectivismiii, and 
rational choice theory (e.g. Coleman and Fararo, 1992; Nida-Rümelin, 1994) has developed 
very deep insights into specific applications of it, e.g. by explaining individual behaviour as 
being determined by institutional frameworks (e.g. Becker, 1996; Frey, 1990, 1997). Central 
tenets of these theories are that individuals maximize a utility or welfare function, that 
markets exist for the coordination of human actions, and that preferences are stable between 
individuals and over time.iv This is not the place to discuss the history or success of these 
models, as we want to concentrate on alternative decision models based on different 
assumptions.  
 
Many philosophers and economists have criticized rational choice approaches in economic 
settings, especially when it comes to ethical problems and dilemma situations. Amartya Sen’s 
critique for instance is based on the following: Utilitarianism as possible basis for rational 
choice approaches gives too much importance to the “well-being” aspect of a person, lacking 
an analysis of “agency” and freedom aspects of the same person. We can build goals and 
values without drawing direct utility from that; in addition we cannot abstract from the social 
situation an individual finds itself (a beggar might be satisfied with less addition to happiness 
without us being able to assign an equally small value to the loss of well being by him or her) 
(Sen 1987, p. 45f.). Sen believes that freedom is a deontological category (ibid, p. 61) itself 
and it is important for us to have alternatives of action and to be able to choose between them 
(Sen 1992, p. 49). This ability he calls “capability” – hence his approach is often named 
“capability approach”.  
 
What we take as important input from Sen’s approach is the fact that economic rationality and 
its underlying utilitarianism cannot be the sole decision basis and questions of ethics cannot 
be judged by using revealed preferences.v We wanted to find out if managers in actual 
dilemma situations use other decision bases. Theoretical and empirical research has gathered 
rich material for such alternatives. The next sub sections describe four different concepts 
which are discussed a lot in literature and which we tried to translate into scenarios that 
managerial respondents can judge (and by judging also make transparent underlying decision 
criteria). 
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2.2 Rawlsian and Kantian Decision Criteria 
 
Hauser (2006) argues that humans have a moral organ with which actions and decisions can 
be evaluated. We subconsciously analyse a situation regarding causes that brought about the 
situation and consequences our actions have; only afterwards emotions come into play. He 
developed scenarios incorporating dilemma situations and found out that some principles of 
ethical judgement are universally shared. There are three ideal types of ethical judgements: 
Individuals making moral judgements by using reasoning with certain principles are called 
“Kantian” creatures (ibid, p. 14f.). These persons define actions as morally permissible (or not 
permissible) on the basis of universal abstract principles and rules (like the categorical 
imperative of Kant). Emotions do not enter this decision process, neither do consequences of 
actions: lying to save a life may bring about a positive total utility but that is out of the 
question for the Kantian. 
 
Ideal types on the other hand who have certain personal characteristics and a native moral 
sense which motivates them towards specific actions are called “Humean” creatures (ibid, p. 
24f.). An action causes emotions of the person touched by the action and triggers a judgement 
of the “impartial spectator”. If an action is perceived as morally positive by the target person, 
the spectator feels sympathy for the action taker. He then judges the action as ethically 
correct. Only emotions can trigger moral judgements, reasoning can only help with causal 
relationships between means and ends. 
 
The third ideal type according to Hauser (ibid, p. 43ff.) is the “Rawlsian” creature. Moral 
judgements are made by using a universal moral grammar working subconsciously and 
quickly when seeing an ethical dilemma. This grammar relies on universally shared principles 
which are slightly adapted according to cultural differences. E.g. it is a shared value that it is 
morally forbidden to torture children. While child murder is a barbaric act in Western 
civilizations, it is sometimes morally allowed for Innuits to kill their children (because of 
limited resources). There are general rules and cultural exceptions to the rule. While the 
Humean creature would not approve such an action because of the negative emotion it 
triggers, the Rawlsian creature analyses causes and consequences leading to a moral 
judgement. 
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The different “trolley” and “lifeboat” scenarios Hauser used to discern the working principles 
in our moral judgements showed a prominent role for the Rawlsian creature. Two major 
principles came to light in the respondents’ analyses: Prohibition of intentional battery, which 
forbids direct physical contact causing harm to other persons and the principle of double 
effect, meaning that usually forbidden actions may be permitted if the harm they cause is not 
intended and the foreseen and intended good consequences of the action outweigh the 
foreseen bad consequences.  
 
So the test persons were not purely deontological (killing is always bad), nor purely utilitarian 
(maximizing the total good is right), but they intuitively analysed causes and consequences of 
an action, judged the individual’s intentions and developed a judgement for which afterwards 
a coherent explanation for the most part was not given. This “Rawlsian” kind of reasoning 
also played a major part in our survey of management decisions (see section 4). 
 
2.3 Fairness and “Reference Transactions” 
 
Experimental economics has developed many insights on how fairness influences our 
behaviour. Game theoretical analyses like the “ultimatum game” (e.g. Thaler 1994a, p. 23ff.) 
and “trust game” (e.g. Fehr/Schmidt 2003, p. 214) show that people do not act rationally in 
the sense of maximizing their (money) utility and expecting the same of the other players. 
Instead they show elements of fairness and trust others to play fairly too. Social notions of 
fairness have been researched by Kahneman et al. (1994a, p. 201ff.), introducing the concept 
of a reference transaction. This concept is a case of e.g. a price or wage that is consistent with 
a positive profit for a firm and still perceived as fair by all actors. Customers or workers have 
a stake in the conditions of a reference transaction while the firm has a stake in the reference 
profit (“dual entitlement”). Kahneman et al. give the following example of a telephone 
survey: 
 
Question A: “A small copy shop has an employee who has been working there for 6 months 
and earns 9$/hour. The profit situation is satisfying, but another firm in the region has closed 
its doors and unemployment has risen. Other small shops now hire good employees for 
7$/hour, doing the same work as the employee in the copy shop. The employer reduces her 
wage to 7$/hour. Is this absolutely fair/acceptable/unfair/ very unfair?” 
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17% of respondents (n=98) found this to be acceptable (summarizing the first two categories), 
83% unfair (last two categories). 
 
Question B: “A small copy shop has an employee (like in question A). She leaves the firm 
and the employer now pays 7$/hour to her substitute. Is this absolutely 
fair/acceptable/unfair/very unfair?” 
Now 73% of respondents found this to be acceptable and 27% unfair. 
 
The current wage of an employee obviously serves as a reference for the fairness of future 
changes of this wage, but not so for the wage of a substitute employee. The latter has no 
entitlement to the wage of the former employee (see ibid, p. 202). An action/decision/situation 
can have reference status for two reasons: firstly because it is felt to be fair, secondly because 
it is felt to be normal under the current moral codes of the society. Also, according to 
Kahneman et al (1994b, p. 208), actors in such transactions judge scenarios with three 
elements in mind: They care about being treated fairly and treat others fairly; they are ready to 
avoid doing business with unfair firms, even if that comes at a cost; they have systematic and 
implicit rules for judging the fairness of entrepreneurial actions.vi In one scenario (see section 
4), a more complicated reference transaction is judged by managers of our survey. 
 
2.4 Reciprocal Altruism 
 
Reciprocity can be defined as reciprocal altruism if a person does something for another 
person because she or he expects something from that person. In the case of strong reciprocity 
(see Hauser 2006, p. 81f.) persons even have a disposition to cooperate and sanction those 
who act as free riders, even if such sanctions are costly. Both forms of reciprocity can be used 
to build reputation and secure long term cooperation.  
 
Lakoff (1996, p. 47) uses the metaphor of a balanced moral account to define reciprocity. A 
morally sound action is one that intends to help (and cause a “profit”), an immoral action is 
one that intends to harm (cause a “loss”). If we did something good for another person we 
expect her or him to pay back that debt. This implies two principles: moral actions mean to 
give something of positive value; it is a moral imperative to pay back one’s debts. In the case 
of altruismvii one does something good for somebody without expecting payback, e.g. when a 
person might wish to build up moral credit. The difficult question is what one can expect as a 
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reciprocal action, and when such an expectation might itself be immoral. Our scenario 
“Elisabeth” (see section 4) will show a possible answer. 
 
2.5 Commitment 
 
The concept of commitment was primarily brought into the economics field by Amartya Sen. 
He criticizes Revealed Preference Theory for not being able to include “sympathy” and 
“commitment”. In the case of sympathy, caring for other persons’ goals would directly 
influence one’s own welfare; in the case of commitment one does something for other persons 
without being made off worse when doing nothing. “While sympathy relates similar things to 
each other – namely, welfares of different persons – commitment relates choice to anticipated 
levels of welfare” (Sen 1977, p. 95). A person can choose an alternative with less addition of 
utility for herself, which need not be caused by an erroneous anticipation of foreseen 
consequences. In this sense, sympathy could be included in a rational choice framework (as it 
raises my utility to conduct a non-egoistic action), but commitment cannot (as it is a counter-
preferential action). 
 
Sen gives an example (ibid, p. 97): Two boys find two apples of different size. Boy A says to 
boy B: “You choose”, and B takes the bigger apple. A now argues that this is unfair. “Why”, 
says B, “which one would you have chosen?”. “The smaller one, of course”, says A. B 
answers triumphantly: “Why do you bother then? That was exactly what you got now!”. Boy 
A would have lost less by B’s choice if his hypothetical choice of the smaller apple had been 
based on sympathy and not commitment. 
 
As traditional economic theory tries to depict the wishes of individuals in one sole preference 
ordering, consistent choice behaviour within this ordering seems to be enough for being 
rational. But how can a sense of commitment for a specific group (family, friends, social 
class) or rule (to choose the smaller apple) be modelled when this means departing from 
maximizing personal utility? How can moral judgements enter a single preference structure, 
even more so as one preference structure could be more ethical than another but less ethical 
than a third one. Sen (ibid, p. 103ff.) suggests orderings over preference orderings (“meta-
preferences”), a possibility we will not discuss here. We developed a commitment scenario 
(“Paul”) in which commitment to a rule seems to outweigh personal utility in the form of 
bonus payments (and even wage cuts) for a manager. 
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3. Survey Design 
 
The survey included executives and middle managers (project managers) in Austrian 
companies and used an online questionnaire with closed questions and different scenarios. We 
asked about relevant attitudes towards business ethics topics and business ethics initiatives. 
The scenarios were created to discern underlying ethical values and decisions bases of 
managers when confronted with ethical dilemma situations. Scenario technique (see Hauser 
2006 and http://moral.wjh.harvard.edu/index.html) can help avoiding socially desired answers 
by having managers judge the behaviour of third persons. All questions and scenarios were 
derived after a literature survey and a qualitative pre study with expert interviews. In this 
section only those questions and scenarios are described, which may give insights on the 
concepts discussed above (section 2). 
 
The first version of the questionnaire was submitted to a pre-test with 20 persons and 
modified according to feedbacks. It took persons 15-20 minutes to fill out the questionnaire. 
Appr. 4.000 invitations to Austrian managers were sent out and 415 questionnaires could be 
used for statistical analyses. We analysed data with SPSS 11.5 for Windows. According to the 
respective question and check of prerequisites the following statistical methods were used:  
 
For an analysis of mean value comparisons (with regard to scale levels and check of normal 
distribution and „homogeneity“ of data, which were not the case) we used non-parametric 
tests: The Mann/Withney U-test to compare two independent samples or the Kruskal/Wallis 
H-test for more than two independent samples. To check correlations between single variables 
we used Spearman rank order correlations. As support method we took Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests to check normal distribution. The Levene test to check „homogeneity“ of variances was 
not necessary due to the non-existence of normal distribution. The level of significance was 
set at 0,05. As a method of discerning structure in data we used a hierarchical cluster analysis 
with the aim of finding „types“ of managers differentiated according to attitudes and 
decisions.   
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
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4.1 The Rawls/Kant Decision type 
 
In order to filter general decision types in management settings we asked some questions 
dealing with the informational basis of managerial decisions. According to Sen and other 
critical economists, decisions of individuals can only be explained with economic rationality, 
and therefore without a more detailed analysis of the individual’s goals or rules, if these 
decisions are grounded in utility maximization. Sen calls this the restricted informational 
basis of utilitarianism. The first questions therefore to deal with this problem are aimed 
towards the understanding Austrian managers have of „rational actions“. This includes 
fairness and Rawlsian intuitive decision making, utility maximization, justifications of actions 
in private or organizational settings, actions according to the Kantian categorical imperative, 
and Humean empathy as decision basis; the corresponding managerial decision types in our 
typology (which is partly taken from Hauser 2006) are: 
- Rawlsian, a person who uses fairness criteria in her or his decision making and relies 
on intuitive accounting for causes and consequences 
- Utilitarian, a person who sees the maximization of own good or personal professional 
utility as rational 
- Relativist (private), a person who sees justifications of actions before kinship or 
friends and their expectations as rational 
- Relativist (organizational), a person who sees justifications of actions before the 
organization she or he works for and its expectations as rational 
- Kantian, a person who wants to treat others as they treat her or him and acts according 
to a felt duty as an executive 
- Humean, a person who uses empathy in her or his management decisions and acts 
according to personal feelings regarding right or wrong. 
 
Our task was to assign each answer a type of managerial decision, e.g.: “If I act rationally as 
an executive, this means to me to maximize my utility” would assign a Utilitarian decision 
type to this person. To get a first impression on decision criteria the respondents use in their 
actions we collected top box answers (total agreement and agreement to the items) to this 
question. Rational actions for the respondent as a manager mean to include fairness 
considerations and the categorical imperative (to treat others as oneself wants to be treated). 
Rawlsian and Kantian criteria are in the forefront of the manager’s actions. Other justification 
models, like the organizational or private relativist (as we call this type) are in the midfield of 
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answers; empathy and utility maximization (the Hume type and the Utilitarian, according to 
Hauser’s (2006) typology) do not play a central role in rational decision making as a manager. 
 
A similar picture is depicted when analysing another question on decisions in the usual 
management setting; an example: “I take my decisions in everyday management according to 
my felt duty as an executive” would mean that Kantian thinking has a certain role to play 
here. Top box answers center around experience and intuition (Rawlsian elements according 
to Hauser 2006), feelings about right and wrong (Humean criteria), and the felt duty of an 
executive (Kantian element). In contrast to the first question, personal feelings regarding the 
rightness of an action play a bigger role. If we construct the average value (each pair’s mean 
value) of the two questions, the Rawls type (51,3%, n=415) and the Kant type (44,2%, n=415) 
are the most important decision types here.  
 
To prove this result a hierarchical cluster analysis including the named questions was 
conducted, showing one cluster. It seems Austrian managers decide in a mixed manner, 
integrating Rawlsian and Kantian elements. 385 Cases (n=415) were submitted to the 
hierarchical cluster analysis. The cluster analysis produces a dendogram showing the 
proximity of the answers. The dendogram doesn’t show a split, so we can say that Austrian 
managers make their decisions having Kant and Rawls decision criteria in mind (minding of 
course the very general type of question asking such criteria in our questionnaire). 
 
The results of the first questions and the cluster analysis show that neither utilitarian criteria 
of utility maximization nor expectations of the private or professional environment seem to 
influence ethical decision making processes of managers very strongly. Rather, some 
elements of John Rawls’ (1988, 2006) theory with its focus on fairness, experience, and 
intuition have a big impact on such processes, followed by Kantian elements of duty fulfilling 
and categorical imperatives. Of course, at this stage of the survey, we surely have social 
desirability as a problem here; this was improved upon by using scenario questions for all 
other topics of managerial decision bases. 
 
Let us compare these results with a survey of another professional group in Austria, namely 
occupational physicians (see Litschka 2009, p. 52ff). This survey was conducted in 2008 and 
asked respondents to depict conflicts in their work as doctors in business enterprises. Besides 
personal conflicts and strategic as well as communication and framework order problems the 
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questionnaire asked about decision bases of occupational physicians when moral questions 
are concerned. Here, 82,6% (n=149) of all respondents put their personal conscience at the 
fore of such criteria, followed by duties they have to follow (72,5%, n=149). Ranked No. 5 
and 6 in this category was “virtues” and “intuition” (above 40% consent, n=149). The 
maximization of utility (“what is useful for most persons, including me”) does not seem to 
play such a big role: only 14,1% (n=149) of occupational physicians use this concept for 
moral decision making. 
 
In another study, Karmasin (2005, p. 131ff.) surveyed decision bases of Austrian journalists 
regarding the intermediate position of this profession between economic and 
journalistic/public interests of media enterprises. When asked “what is good and what is 
bad?”, they put their own conscience on the first place in a ranking of decision factors (49%, 
n=122). Their own reason (a Kantian aspect) comes second, whereas Utilitarian criteria (“to 
watch the effects of an action; is it useful or harmful?”) lack behind (only 6%, n=122, see this 
as the most important decision base).  
 
It is interesting to see that in another context (though with slightly different questions), very 
similar results hold for other professions. Occupational physicians in Austria seem to also 
take Rawlsian criteria of intuitive decision making and Kantian elements of “duty” and 
“conscience” as central bases for their ethical decisions; similarly Austrian journalists stick to 
their conscience and reason when ethical dilemmas have to be solved. Utilitarian reasoning, 
religion (the Ten Commandments), discursive considerations, or pure emotional thinking on 
the other hand were not found to be very important decision factors. 
 
4.2 Fairness 
 
The first theoretical concept (as an alternative to economic rational motives) we wanted to test 
in our survey was fairness. While there are too many discussions on fairness in the literature 
to mention, we start by using the Kahneman notion of a “reference transaction” (see above 
section 3). We conceptualized this specific notion of fairness in our scenario “Erwin”. 
 
We wanted to know how morally correct a situation would be judged in which a greengrocer 
raises his prices as soon as a government subsidy goes to the persons in need in his region. On 
the one hand he charges the (probably equilibrium-) price of all his subsidiaries, on the other 
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hand he places the burden of helping the ones in need to society as a whole. The question is if 
he is allowed to raise the reference price or whether this is judged unethical behaviour. The 
scenario text runs as follows: 
 
“The greengrocer Erwin runs a few subsidiaries in his region, one of them being placed in a 
district of high poverty. Up till now prices in this specific subsidiary have been slightly lower 
than in the other subsidiaries of the dealer. Since the day persons in need in this district have 
been receiving a government subsidy in the form of food vouchers (a certain amount of 
Euros) to be spent in the groceries of the district, Erwin has been raising the prices in the 
named subsidiary to the level of his other subsidiaries. 
How moral is Erwin’s decision?” 
(very moral(1)/ rather moral(2)/ morally neutral(3)/ rather immoral(4)/ very immoral(5)/ no 
answer) 
 
The tendency of answers in this scenario is to judge Erwin’s action as morally neutral (41,4%) 
to rather immoral (37,3%); (M=3.46; SD= .849). Almost 10% of respondents find his decision 
very immoral. This is confirmation of the economic psychological thesis that reference 
transactions are orientation points of fairness to which enterprises have to stick or at least 
need strong arguments to change that situation. Even though Erwin does not raise his prices 
arbitrarily and not above the market price, and even though the persons in need are not worse 
off than before, he places an additional burden of the size of the subsidy on society’s 
shoulders. In addition (at least that’s a possible interpretation of the scenario) he takes away 
the relative advantage, represented by the subsidy, of the ones in need. Obviously, this kind of 
economic rationale in place here is not sufficient for managers to judge the situation as fair. 
 
Answering the question of which part of all other dealers would decide like Erwin, there 
seems to be a rather distrustful assessment given by respondents (M=3.79; SD= 1.012); 42% 
believe that 61-80% of all other dealers would take Erwin’s decision, one that basically is 
judged rather immoral or morally neutral. If we correlate scenario “Erwin” (“How moral is 
Erwin’s decision”; M=3.46; SD= .849) with a question on ethical dilemma situations (see 
below), we see a consistent negative relation. The less such situations are perceived as ethical 
problems, the more ethical this scenario is judged. We had respondents evaluate the following 
(ethically problematic) dilemma situations:   
 To hide information from customers in order to gain an advantage 
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 To reduce the number of employees in financially hard times 
 To reduce the number of employees in financially good times 
 To outsource in low-wage countries, even though the company got Austrian 
government subsidies 
 To pay bonuses to executives whose highest priority is short term profit maximization 
 To represent other values in the company than in private life 
 
A correlation analysis of these items with the above scenario shows: 
 
 M SD Erwin 
Erwin 3.46 0.849  
1. Customer Information 2.07 1.091 -.155** 
2. Employee reduction (crisis) 3.11 1.091 -.234** 
3. Employee reduction (good 
times) 
1.90 1,060 -.193** 
4. Production outsourcing 1.69 0.989 -.172** 
5. Bonus payments  1.63 0.970 -.262** 
6. Other values in company 2.02 1.066 -.212** 
*p<.05. **p<.01. 
Table 1: Correlation scenario “Erwin” and specific moral dilemma situations 
 
Another relationship was found when correlating scenario “Erwin” with questions on fairness 
(see below). The items for this question are partly taken from Lakoff’s (1996) linguistic 
analysis of different fairness patterns, while two items representing the two Rawlsian criteria 
of fairness (equal liberties and difference principle) were added. All items were changed 
according to what the qualitative pre-study had shown to be understandable concepts for 
managers not trained in business ethics terms. The text ran as follows: 
 
„How ‚fair’ do you judge the following statements? It is fair if...“   
 
 GDP is distributed equally to all inhabitants 
 Professional chances in society are distributed equally 
 Distribution of GDP is made by rules which are fixed beforehand 
 Persons in need get more of GDP 
 Each inhabitant gets the share of GDP which the law states she or he should get 
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 Persons who work more get a larger share of GDP 
 Each person has the same responsibility for the production of GDP 
 Persons who can objectively perform worse (e.g. because of illness) have a smaller 
responsibility for the production of GDP 
 Inequalities in society are allowed as long as they help disadvantaged people 
 Each person has the same right to the biggest possible freedoms, as long as these 
freedoms do not restrict the freedoms of other people 
 Power is distributed equally in society 
 Every distribution reached by consented contracts is fair 
 
Before conducting a correlation analysis we can have a look at the basic evaluation of these 
fairness concepts: The result was that the most important fairness criteria are the biggest 
possible distribution of basic freedoms and the equity of chances at the starting points of a life 
(a career). The “scalar distribution of responsibility” (who is objectively only able to perform 
worse, e.g. due to illness, has less responsibility for the production of GDP) was also chosen 
very often by executives. All of this shows a rather egalitarian (and certainly Rawlsian) 
attitude of managers, a slight surprise in the face of the modern socialization process of 
executives in the market economy. If asked for “equity” in a rather direct way, e.g. in the 
form of “equity of distribution” (GDP is distributed equally in society), consent of the 
respondents is reduced. Obviously, we need an additional criterion like freedom or equity of 
chance, in order to accept egalitarian concepts of fairness; of course most theories of fairness 
provide such criteria. As soon as such criteria are there, managers choose Rawlsian and 
egalitarian concepts, as well as Sen’s possibilities to choose (“capabilities”), while contracts, 
rights, and rules do not play such a big role with questions of fairness. 
 
 If we now correlate those items from above which concern the GDP of a country and its 
distribution with our scenario question, we can see an interesting result. 
Persons judging Erwin’s behaviour as rather immoral see the following concepts as rather 
fair: if the GDP is equally distributed and if this distribution is made according to rules fixed 
beforehand. This is intuitively clear, as Erwin compensates for part of the public “equal 
distribution”, brought about by government subsidies, by his raising the prices, respectively 
does not keep to the “rule” of the reference transaction (the lower price). Of course these 
respondents want persons in need to get more of GDP, which is undermined by Erwin’s 
action.  
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 M SD Erwin 
Erwin 3.46 0.849  
1. GNP equal distribution 3.92 1.050 -.111* 
2. GNP according to fixed rules 3.18 1.250 -.129** 
3. Persons in need get more 2.70 1.077 -.122* 
4. GDP according to law 2.96 1.173 -.068 
5. Work more – more GDP 2.16 .962 .128** 
6. Same responsibility for GDP 3.18 1.231 -.081 
7. Illness – less responsibility 2.10 0.969 -.120* 
*p<.05. **p<.01. 
Table 2: Correlation scenario “Erwin” and conceptions of fairness 
 
4.3 Reciprocal Altruism 
 
To get an impression of how managers use a concept of reciprocal altruism (to depict 
altruistic behaviour in expectation of a reciprocal favour by somebody else), we developed a 
scenario (“Betty”) with the following features: 
 
“Betty is an executive in a major oil company. This enterprise is successfully doing business 
with dictatorship countries. Recently, there has been increasing public pressure to stop such 
business. There are some human rights organizations (NGOs) responsible for this pressure. 
Betty negotiates with the most important NGOs and offers to change the relevant company 
policy, but only if these NGOs start to comment positively in public on the company and 
Betty.  
How moral is Betty’s decision?” 
(very moral(1)/ rather moral(2)/ morally neutral(3)/ rather immoral(4)/ very immoral (5)/ no 
answer) 
 
Betty changes her company policy in favour of certain important stakeholders (here: NGOs) 
only if they commit to saying solely positive things about her and her company. Betty expects 
a return service (“quid pro quo”) which advances her reputation for an obviously ethically 
correct attitude. This attitude of expectation can be described as reciprocity and her will to 
conduct a morally sound action under this condition as reciprocal altruism. 
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The tendency of respondents here is to categorize this action as rather immoral (40,5%, 
n=415). 17,8% find this decision very immoral. Obviously the aim of getting a return service 
for an action that is ethically appropriate from the beginning (i.e. stopping business with 
dictators) is rather an unethical gesture. Even though ethical theory has accepted reciprocal 
altruism as one form of fair behaviour, it seems to be important how ethically self evident the 
basic action is (here: Betty’s offer to ground her business policy on ethical grounds) – if there 
is the belief that such an action is taken for granted, a reciprocal action is less expectable than 
if Betty had made a preparatory effort with an ethical action less taken for granted. 
 
Three quarters of respondents believe that 41 to 100% of other executives would decide like 
Betty. They seem to take a rather immoral form of reciprocal altruism to be an important 
decision base for managers. 
 
A correlation analysis with our list of fairness notions (see above) showed that managers who 
judged the Betty scenario as moral (M= 3.62; SD= .982) did not judge one of Rawls’ fairness 
criteria, namely the right to equal and biggest possible basic freedoms, to be important (M= 
1.41; SD= .706; low negative correlation r(399)=-.123, p= .014). Reciprocal altruism and 
Rawlsian elements of justice are not decision factors used at the same time, at least in our 
sample. 
 
4.4 Commitment 
 
A behaviour of commitment is depicted in the next scenario “Paul”. It tries to explore whether 
a manager is willing to stand up for somebody else (whom he maybe does not know 
personally), in this case not to lay off some employees even though the board wants him to do 
so, threatening with pay cuts and loss of bonus payments. What we asked here is commitment 
for a specific rule, even though personal utility is touched negatively and the improvement of 
well-being of the others does not influence the own utility function (in lack of personal 
relationships within a big company). That is exactly what Sen would call pure commitment 
(see above). The text ran as follows: 
 
 “Paul is in the executive board of a major steel company. In the board meeting to come all 
executive officers must propose savings measures regarding their departments. Should the 
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combined measures be able to save a certain sum of money, the chief executive director is 
willing to secure the promised bonus payments to all directors this year. If the sum is not 
reached, all directors will have to face a severe pay cut. Paul knows that the other colleagues 
will offer to lay off 10 percent of their employees. If he himself does the same, the overall 
sum the CEO wants to have saved is reached. If he does not do this, the sum is not reached 
and all directors (including Paul) will have to face the pay cuts. In the meeting, Paul proposes 
not to lay off any employees and the savings goal is missed. 
How moral is Paul’s decision? 
(very moral(1)/ rather moral(2)/ morally neutral(3)/ rather immoral(4)/ very immoral(5)/ no 
answer) 
 
More than half of the respondents judge Paul’s decision to be moral, a quarter say it is rather 
moral. Consent to a behaviour that damages the own utility function but shows commitment 
for a group of persons or a rule which helps them is high among the respondent executives. 
 
Returning to some frequent dilemma situations in everyday management (see above), we can 
again look at possible correlations. One dilemma is the payment of bonuses to executives who 
deem short term profit maximization as their highest goal. Interestingly (as shown by a 
correlation analysis, see table 3), managers who judge Paul’s behaviour as rather immoral do 
not find bonus payments of this kind to be morally problematic. I.e. persons who cannot 
identify themselves with Paul’s behaviour and even judge it to be unethical do not have 
problems in general with bonus payments under questionable criteria. This would confirm 
that further public discussions about management payment is necessary, as sometimes the 
incentive for executives to not comply with socially expected behaviour is too big. In 
addition, all other dilemma situations correlate positively with scenario “Paul”, i.e. managers 
understanding dilemma situations to be ethically problematic also accept Paul’s decision to be 
ethically sound. 
 
 M SD Erwin 
How moral is Paul´s decision? 1.56 0.78  
1. Customer Information 2.07 1.091 .159** 
2. Employee reduction (crisis) 3.11 1.091 .258** 
3. Employee reduction (good 
times) 
1.90 1,060 .365** 
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4. Production outsourcing 1.69 0.989 .236** 
5. Bonus payments  1.63 0.970 .284** 
6. Other values in company 2.02 1.066 .198** 
*p<.05. **p<.01. 
Table 3: Correlation scenario “Paul” and moral dilemma situations 
 
Again, expectations towards other managers’ behaviour are more than pessimistic. More than 
60% believe that only 0-20% of other executives would take the same decision as Paul; that at 
least 21-40% of the others would show such a behaviour of commitment is believed by only 
24% of respondents. That could be interpreted as follows: If somebody takes the place of Paul 
and judges this behaviour from the point of view of an impartial spectator, one does not 
believe in the ability of empathy of other managers. Either our respondents believe that others 
do not have the same moral sense (and therefore do not understand why they should act like 
Paul), or they doubt the feasibility of the “right thing” in management practice. While the 
former would be a problem of management ethics (socialization, role models, education, etc.), 
the latter is a structural problem of incentive systems, competitive pressure, decision 
hierarchies, etc. Both topics were also mentioned in the qualitative pre-study of this research 
project and stress the importance of analysing all levels of business ethics where places to 
install ethics measures can be found. 
 
5. Résumé: Business Ethical Alternatives to Economic Rationality within 
Management Decisions 
 
There have been of course many elaborate criticisms of the belief that people decide on the 
basis of economic rational deliberations. Chapter 2 gave a rough overview. One of the most 
compelling alternative models was provided by Amartya Sen, stating that rational choice and 
revealed preference theory do not adequately picture the true decision behaviour of persons. 
This is due to the following thesis: On the one side, there is informational content not 
expressed by the “choice” of a person, but influencing personal welfare; on the other side, 
welfare makes up for only a part of those deliberations which enter the personal choice 
behaviour. 
 
From the many conclusions which could follow such an insight, we chose the following 
alternative concepts and tested them via specific scenario questions: certain Rawlsian 
elements of fairness, which (in our survey) combine with Kantian elements of the categorical 
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imperative; fairness as conceived by a reference transaction; commitment as a behaviour that 
sticks to rules even if personal welfare is negatively touched; reciprocal altruism as a 
cooperative behaviour that expects a reciprocal beneficial action from other persons. These 
concepts have been confirmed in our study with different degrees of consent by managers. In 
the following the central points of the results are repeated with a view to intercultural 
implications for business ethics as well as possible (and necessary) future research. 
 
The Rawlsian type with Kantian elements: Our sample of managers does not consist of 
utilitarians; they neither deem it rational to only maximize their own utility, nor do they want 
to make managerial decisions according to personal utility alone. They rather include fairness 
considerations into their decisions and build on their experience and intuition when making 
moral decisions. These are Rawlsian elements of ethical decision processes beyond utility or 
estimation of consequences (consequentialism as part of utilitarianism). Furthermore, the 
categorical imperative (in the form of “treating others as I want to be treated by them”) plays 
a possibly bigger role in decision processes as one may think, as well as the “felt duty of an 
executive”; these are the Kantian parts of managerial decisions as far as our online survey 
could define them. This result is also confirmed by two additional methodological steps: our 
qualitative pre-study (expert interviews, not described in this paper), where managers and 
researchers stated exactly those principles, and a cluster analysis which filtered the 
Rawls/Kant type as only statistically significant type according to our proposed typology. 
When we describe the results of our fairness scenario (see below), Rawlsian fairness is again 
a central anchor for decisions in dilemma situations. Future ethics research in business should 
give strong regard to Rawls’ theory of justice, also on a micro level of individual decisions. 
 
Commitment: To care for a specific group of people or stick to a specific rule without 
drawing personal utility from it is the basic feature of commitment according to Sen. Consent 
to the decision of manager “Paul” (i.e. not laying off people to secure a bonus payment or 
even to just keep the level of one’s salary) was remarkable. Persons not agreeing with Paul 
also do not sense any ethical problems with e.g. bonus payments for short term measures of 
profit maximization or similar situations (as asked in the questionnaire). A problem for future 
research is the mixed result concerning what managers judge as ethical behaviour and what 
their colleagues do in reality according to respondents. As clearly as they give their consent to 
Paul’s behaviour, they doubt the ethical basis of other executives; those others would not 
decide as Paul does and choose the unethical alternative. This can have two reasons: one does 
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not believe in the ability of empathic behaviour of people in general, or one doubts the 
practical feasibility of such decisions under competitive pressure and similar structural 
problems. This could be a sign of a hard to overcome difference between management ethics 
(socialization, role expectation, education) and framework ethics (incentive systems like 
bonus payments, competition factors, hierarchies in companies, to name a few). Analysis of a 
scenario can only answer part of that question and future research projects must try to work 
out this difference in a more sophisticated manner. 
 
Reciprocal altruism: This concept models a behaviour that is altruistic as long as a 
reciprocal beneficial action of another person can be expected. Scenario “Betty” describes 
such a situation, in which a manager undertakes a morally sound action (to change the 
company policy regarding doing business with dictatorships), if as a return service some 
stakeholders (here: the NGOs) praise her and her company in public. The majority of 
managers judge this behaviour as immoral. Seemingly it is not appropriate to expect a 
reciprocal action for a behaviour which other persons take for ethically granted. Even though 
reciprocal altruism is often described as “fair” behaviour in business ethics literature, this is 
not a valid argument when the basic action (the “preparatory action”) is ethical a priori. This 
again leaves room for further research, which develops more exact questions and scenarios for 
altruistic and reciprocal behaviour. And again, other managers (41-100% according to 
respondents) decide as Betty, showing a supposed frequent existence of reciprocal altruism, 
though this decision basis is not ethical in the view of our respondents. 
 
Fairness: In addition to the fairness elements provided by a specific framework (Lakoff 
1996), managers had to answer a scenario depicting Kahneman’s suggestion of seeing 
fairness in terms of a “reference transaction”. Scenario “Erwin” tries to model such a 
transaction without a clear or obvious moral content. Though one could concede to Erwin the 
right to raise his prices as soon as the ones in need in his region are subsidized by the 
government, he seems to hurt a reference transaction (the former prices of the goods in his 
store). His action takes away (through higher prices) the additional utility from the subsidy of 
the persons in need. Also, he places the burden of support to society (the government). The 
respondents judge this to be rather unfair (morally neutral to rather immoral). Unanimous 
dissent with Erwin’s decision was not to be expected, but the tendency of answers show the 
importance of an anchor of fairness as represented by the reference transaction, to which 
 23
managers should stick. The economic rationale behind this scenario is not sufficient when 
analysing the ethical content of such an action. 
 
Implications for international and intercultural business ethics: It is a rather open 
question in philosophy whether empirical results such as those reported in this paper hold in 
different professional, cultural, and regional environments. We already stated in chapter 4 
that, at least for some professions that have been analysed in other studies, we could find 
similar decision bases when ethical problems are concerned. Now we want to turn our 
attention to some intercultural aspects. The complicated debate on universalism versus 
relativism can be of special importance to managers when they have to decide on which 
values should guide their decisions: If values of their own company in the home country are 
valid in subsidiaries abroad, an ethnocentric attitude is at work; if those values are adapted to 
the culture of the guest country, cultural relativism is the paradigm (Kreikebaum et al., p. 
112). Of course there are “in-between strategies” such as a multi-domestic or a transnational 
approach (Veser 2005, p. 39ff.). The more basic question of concern here is twofold: It is 
ethically problematic for managers to take their home values as universally valid (on which 
grounds?), but it may also be dangerous to simply accept different moral conceptions as a 
descriptive fact with normative validity, as this amounts to a naturalistic fallacy (de George 
1993, p. 8ff.). In fact managers may need a well-founded standard for the meaning of “right” 
and “wrong” or “justice” when dealing with intercultural problems in their business. 
Donaldson (1989, p. 16f) shows how denying this need may lead into self contradiction, while 
Kreikebaum et al. (2001, p. 118f., p. 130ff.) plead for a discourse ethical conflict management 
to solve such intercultural problems in ethics. Karmasin (2005, p. 134) stresses the cultural 
dependency of empirical results in business ethics and demands a more formal (instead of 
material) approach to moral reasoning, a point also made by the other named authors. In a 
globalized economy, such concepts will get more importance and questions of 
implementation of these and other concepts have to be dealt with. 
 
In the light of the theoretical and empirical findings in this paper, is there even a need to take 
intercultural differences into account? Is it not enough to just rely on some universal 
principles managers have in mind when ethical decisions are at stake? As the general 
approach of our survey has some elements in common with Hauser’s (2006) study on a basic 
moral understanding all humans share, it seems this question can be answered positively. 
Chapter 2.2 depicted some of his major arguments: that there are general principles at work 
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(like e.g. “prohibition of intentional battery”), which are adapted slightly for different cultures 
and societies; that Rawlsian decision structures guide our moral understanding; that these 
structures are universally valid, independent of culture, religion, gender etc.  The implications 
for future research in (intercultural) economic and business ethics might be that formal 
general principles guide management decisions in practice, but that these principles are 
slightly adapted when different cultural backgrounds are involved.   
 
Our general conclusion is that the direction of behavioural economics with its experiments 
and inclusion of psychological and ethical elements may pave the way of operationalizing the 
important concepts of business and economic ethics, which were partly developed as 
alternative to economic rationality. Much more work needs to go into methodology 
(questionnaires, scenarios, socially desired answers when ethics is concerned) and theoretical 
work on ethical concepts like commitment, fairness, and reciprocal altruism. If successful, 
these theoretical concepts can be proven to work in everyday management decisions, or at 
least it could be shown how such concepts can enter managerial work. Another small step 
towards integrating ethics, economics, and business administration would be possible.  
 
                                                 
i Austrian Central Bank Jubilee Fund; project nr. 12939; “Management and Ethics in Austrian 
Companies. Empirical Analysis of Ethical and Economic Decision Bases”. 
ii The qualitative interviews are not part of this paper, the literature research only insofar as it touches 
the theoretical concepts used for the survey. 
iii The Austrian School of Economics has provided a lot of research dealing with these propositions, 
e.g. in Mises 1933 or Menger 1871, 1883. 
iv Other important contributions to the question of economic rationality from economists are Friedman’s 
„as if“-proposition (Friedman 1953), Robbins’ deductive theory building (Robbins 1935), Mises’ 
„Praxeology“ (Mises 1949), Hayek’s „use of knowledge in society“ (Hayek 1945), or Homann’s 
application of economic rationality to ethical problems (Homann/Meyer 2005). 
v As Sen states: „A person is given one preference ordering, and as and when the need arises this is 
supposed to reflect his interests, represent his welfare, summarize his idea of what should be done, 
and describe his actual choice and behavior. Can one preference ordering do all these things?“ (Sen 
1977: 102). 
vi See above the description of Rawlsian creature in moral reasoning. 
vii Folbre and Goodin (2004: 3ff.) explain why pure altruism is notoriously difficult to model in economic 
terms. This is due to the „paradox of mutual revelation“ concerning the difficulty to model an altruistic 
preference structure, and the problem of „masked preferences“ concerning the intentional 
misrepresentation of preferences for social reasons.  
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